Introduction and the Agenda of the Group Discussions
The concept of representation has proven useful in the study of nervous, com putational and robotic systems. Examples of representation from neuro science include descriptions of the visual system, where the activity of neurons reflect properties of the visual environm ent (e.g. Hubei and Wiesel, 1968; Martin, 1994) . C entral brain areas contain representations: for example neurons in the hippo campus are influenced in a predictable fashion by the position of the animal (O ' Keefe and Nadel, 1978) . In the m otor system the activity of neurons relates to the activation of muscles and coordinate movement (e.g. Georgopoulos et al., 1982) . The concept of a neural representation covers a wide range of phenom ena, from the relation between sensory inputs and the environm ent through neu ral codes of an organisms location within the envi ronm ent to the relationship between neural activ ity and m otor actions allowing interaction with the environment. Issues of representation are also found in com putational science and robotics. For example, com putational models of information processing for categorization of inputs can be broadly divided into two classes: those that postu late a single "object-centred" representation of each category or object and those that postulate multiple units to represent each category or object * This communication is a contribution to the workshop on "Natural Organisms, Artificial Organisms, and Their Brains" at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld (Germany) on March 8-12, 1998. Reprint requests to Dr. P. König, Institut für Neuroinformatik, ETH/Universität Zürich, Gloriastraße 32, CH-8006 Zürich. Fax: 1-6344983. E-mail: PeterK@ini.phys.ethz.ch.
(c.f. Bülthoff et al., 1995; Biederm an and Kalocsai, 1997) .
Questions about more abstract aspects of repre sentations include the basis of the representation: Is a representation a holistic, "all knowing" entity or a "subjective" entity based on the experiences unique to the individual? Integral to the concept of representation are questions of how the repre sentation was formed: How is a representation maintained? To what extent is a representation labile? What factors induce change in the repre sentation?. In this group report we draw together current views of researchers from neuroscience, computational science and robotics regarding some of these issues. We take concrete examples based on the work of the participants and note areas of agreement and disagreement. It should be noted at the outset that the level of agreem ent was high. Each m ember had made independently sub tle shifts from the traditional views of their respec tive areas, leading to the resolution of previously disparate opinions between different disciplines. The consensus of opinion concerning representa tions suggests that rapid progress will be possible in the future.
To orient the reader, one of the m ajor themes that quickly became clear during the discussions was that the use of representation in a passive sense was inconsistent with the available data. The interaction of a representation with the input and output structures of that representation were im portant and fit data in a more consistent m anner than regarding representations as entities indepen dent of the organism and its environm ent. These structures formed a closed loop: environm ent in teracting with sensory representations, sensory representations interacting with representations of action and action interacting with the environ ment, which of course leads back to interaction with the sensory representations. The im portance 0939-5075/98/0700-0738 $ 06.00 © 1998 Verlag der Zeitschrift für Naturforschung, Tübingen • www.znaturforsch.com. D of this closed loop was determ ined by researchers of biological systems and researchers of artificial systems, so may be a general property of represen tations. Neil Burgess's examination of the repre sentation of "W here am I?" in the place cells of the rat hippocampus provides an intuitive intro duction to representations in biological systems. Studies of neural selectivity in primate temporal lobe (Mike O ram ) suggest that representations of "W hat is th at?" may be intimately tied to "What do I do with it?" Emilio Bizzi shows that represen tations of m otor action allow for the learning of "How do I interact with it?" Evidence that in teractions occur between different neural repre sentations and that these interactions may be specifically related to behaviour is presented by Peter König. A t this point we briefly take a diver sion from examples of representations and con sider, without resolution, the signal used by neural representations to solve the "binding problem ". Studies of the fly (Nicolas Franceschini), complete with a robotic dem onstration, indicate that a rep resentation can be very transient based on the interaction of the agent (fly or robot) with its envi ronm ent. G erhard Sagerer examines representa tions in artificial systems and argues that appro priate representations meeting computational dem ands should be formed from "experience" and be situated in the present context, rather than from a complete set of rules placed within the sys tem. Studies from robotics (Christian Scheier) show that the problem of object classification can be reduced and be transform ed into a tractable form if the agent (robot) interacts with the envi ronm ent. Finally Mike Kilgard describes work from the rat auditory cortex which demonstrates the impact that the environm ent and behaviourally relevant signals can have on representations and how representations can change in such a way as to allow the agent to m eet new functional de mands placed on the agent by the environment.
Natures of representations
The representation o f space in the rat hippocampus (presented by Neil Burgess)
Place cells in the hippocampus of freely-moving rats tend to fire at a high rate only when the rat is in a particular portion of its environment and lesion of the ra t's hippocampus impair its naviga tional ability (O 'Keefe and Nadel, 1978) . Place cell firing also shows interesting tem poral aspects. The time of firing of spikes relative to the phase of the theta rhythm in the E E G appears to encode the location of the rat with greater precision than the firing rate alone (O 'Keefe and Recce, 1993) . A n other clue to the neural basis of spatial representa tion comes from 'head-direction' cells which show the complementary pattern of spatial firing to place cells. These cells are found near to the hip pocampus and code for the direction of the ra t's head, irrespective of its location (Taube et al., 1990) . However, it is still not clear what inputs drive the firing of these cells, or how their firing generates behaviour.
What is the nature of the interaction with struc tures upstream? In simple walled environm ents it seems likely that the rat uses the allocentric direc tion of each wall to distinguish it from the next, and that the distance from two or m ore of the walls determ ines the firing rate of each place cell (O 'Keefe and Burgess, 1996) . The role of distant visual cues may relate to the ra t's internal sense of direction, and thus, indirectly to place cell firing. Local cues, distant visual cues and the ra t's in ternal sense of orientation (possibly vestibular and proprioceptive in origin) all appear to contribute to the ra t's internal sense of direction, and can each be systematically m anipulated . The inform ation relating to the distances probably also comes via a mixture of visual, olfac tory, auditory, tactile and internal information, de term ined by what is available in a particular envi ronm ent (e.g. Hill and Best, 1981) .
What is the nature of the representation, what is its use, and how does it interact with structures downstream? The place cell representation of space is intriguing in the sense that it appears to reflect the ra t's current location, independent of where it needs to go (Speakman and O 'Keefe, 1990) . How could this be useful? The simplest model (see Burgess et al., 1997) would postulate sets of cells downstream of the place cells that store the place cell representation at goal locations (e.g. by making strong synaptic connections from those place cells active at the goal location). This would allow the rat to return to a goal location by moving so as to maximise the similarity between the current place cell representation and the stored one. Such a simple 'snapshot' type model has limitations, and more sophisticated models have been constructed by making use of the head direction cells and the tem poral coding of infor mation in place cell firing, and tested on a mobile robot (see Burgess et al., 1994; 1997) .
What is the relation to human hippocampal function? Selective damage to the hum an hippo campus appears to specifically impair the recall of events, often sparing the recognition of stimuli or pairs of stimuli (see e.g. Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). How could this relate to the apparently spa tial role of the hippocampus in rats? One sugges tion is that recall of events is aided by memory for the context in which they occurred (e.g. Mayes etal., 1985) . O ne way to reconcile the apparent roles of the hippocampus in rats and humans is to suppose that it stores the spatial context of events, and that this is an im portant recall cue in human episodic memory. More general arguments also suggest that allocentric (world-centred) represen tations might be more appropriate for the long term storage of object locations than egocentric representations (centred on the body, or a part of it), since the position of the body will tend to change over time. Alternatively, short term stor age of the location of an object, between its per ception and an immediate action upon it, might best use an egocentric representation since the lo cation of the object relative to the effector will be needed for control of the action. The data indicat ing that the hippocampus supports allocentric rep resentations (cf. egocentric representations in pari etal cortex) can thus also be related to the data indicating hippocampal involvement in long-term episodic memory and parietal involvement in short term memory (see Burgess et al., this vol ume, for further discussion of this point).
Viewer centered representations in prim ate (presented by M ike O ram )
Properties of the representation of objects in temporal lobe cortices indicate that, at the single cell level, processing of visual inputs occurs pre dominantly in a viewer-centred framework. R e sponses of tem poral lobe neurons are in general dependent on the particular instance in which the object is seen. For example, neural responses of individual cells are contingent on the sight of the stationary head and body in a particular view (e.g. facing to the left of the viewer, Perrett et al. (1982; 1991) ; Desimone et al. (1984) ), orientation (up right) and size 1997) . Again, these responses are mostly viewer-centered, in that a response is elicited only when a particular combination of view and direction of body m otion is seen (e.g. left profile moving left, not left profile moving right nor right profile moving left).
What is the nature of the interaction with struc tures upstream and downstream? W hat is the use of the representation? It is suggested that viewercentered visual processing is useful in enabling ap propriate actions to occur, such as social interac tions with others (e.g. talking with the person looking at you, not the person facing your left), and interactions between others . Interactions with inanim ate objects (picking up a knife by the handle, not the blade) may also require detailed representation of the object (Carey et al., 1997) . Given the viewer-centered processing in "earlier" visual areas (e.g. the orien tation selectivity in V I, V2, V4 and posterior in ferotemporal corices) the viewer centered nature of object representation in STS is not surprising.
The potential relationship between the type of representation of objects (e.g. viewer-centered) and how the organism may interact with those ob jects was further examined by reference to neu rons in the STS which are selective for the sight of particular reaching actions (e.g. Perrett et al., 1989) . In particular, examples of cells selectively responsive to moving towards a door from any di-rection and other cells responsive to the sight of another individual reaching towards and picking up an object were given (i.e. goal-centered). The selectivity of such cells shows that representations of visual stimuli within tem poral cortex can be of actions. Rizolatti and colleagues (M urata et al., 1997) have described cells in m otor areas of fron tal lobe which show similar visual response selectivities (e.g. picking action) as well as the respon siveness to the m otor action when performed by the monkey. The projections from STS to frontal lobes suggest that such cells in motor areas may receive inputs from STS cells similar to those de scribed. Such visual selectivites may be important in the learning of actions and social gestures (Carey et al., 1997) . Finally, evidence exists from neuropsychological studies that representations of objects are necessary for interactions with those objects. M ilner and Goodale (1993) studied a sub ject with brain damage resulting from carbon m on oxide poisoning. The subject showed severe im pairm ent of object recognition but maintained ability to interact with simple objects. While capa ble of performing simple object manipulation (e.g. posting a letter), DF was impaired when object m anipulation became more complex (e.g. fitting a T shape into an appropriately shaped hole). This again supports the proposal that the representa tion of objects in a viewer-centered frame of refer ence is an integral part of the ability to manipulate those objects appropriately.
Formation o f internal m odels o f m otor tasks (presented by Em ilio B izzi)
The hypothesis is that human subjects learn a new task as a result of repeated exposures to sen sory signals coming from their moving limbs and their eyes while they interact with the environ ment. These repeated sensory signals are funneled to the m otor areas of the central nervous system, where signals that activate the muscles are pro duced.
This iterative process would lead to the estab lishment of an internal model of the controlled dy namics -the body and its environment -through the gradual change of the synaptic strength of the neurons of cortical and subcortical motor areas. The internal model, according to this view, is em bedded in the newly formed connectivity of a group of neurons. The activity of this group of neurons generates the neural impulses necessary for the execution of learned m otor tasks. M otor learning and the control of dynamics are thus two facets of the same process.
What is the nature of the interaction with struc tures upstream? In general, in a visual-motor task, such as reaching with the arm toward a target, the first problem is one of transforming information regarding the target position, as presented in the visual domain, into a force to be applied by the muscles to the skeletal system in order to move the hand. Initially, the solution of this problem in volves a set of coordinate transformations. The work of Andersen et al. (1985) suggests that the image of the target is transform ed sequentially from retinocentric to a head-centered and finally a body-centered coordinate system.
To specify a limbs trajectory toward a target, the central nervous system must not only locate the position of an object with respect to the body, but also the initial position of the arm. The conven tional wisdom is that proprioception provides in formation about arm configuration to be used in the programming of the arms trajectory.
The task of moving the hand to the target posi tion is an ill-posed problem in the sense that an exact solution might either not be available or not be unique. For instance, if the goal is to move the hand from an initial position to a point in space, then, clearly there are a num ber of possible hand trajectories that could achieve this goal: the solu tion of this m otor problem is not unique. Even after the central nervous system has chosen a par ticular path for the hand, its im plementation can be achieved with multiple combinations of joint movements at the shoulder, elbow and wristagain the solution is not unique. Finally, because there are many muscles around each joint, the net force generated by their activation can be achieved by a variety of combinations of muscles. The situation is even more complex at the level of individual muscles: eventually the nervous system must specify the activation of each m otor unit.
What are the implications for the formation of representations? A key feature of the task to which subjects were exposed involved a change in the mechanical environm ent with which their hand interacted. Because of this change, the internal model of the arm had to adapt to the new dy-namics of the environment. In these experiments, subjects grasped the handle of a robot manipulandum -a two degree of freedom, lightweight, lowfriction m otor with a force-torque transducer mounted on the handles. Two torque motors were mounted on the basis of the robot. The manipulandum was program med to produce forces upon the hand of the subject as the subject perform ed reaching movements. These forces were computed as a function of the velocity of the hand. When the manipulandum was producing a force field, there were forces that acted on the hand as it made a movement, effectively changing the dynamics of the arm. The force field initially caused a signifi cant divergence from the trajectory that was nor mally observed for reaching movements (Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994) .
Through practice, the subjects hand trajectories converged to the trajectory observed before the application of the field. This convergence was gradual but monotonic in all subjects, consistent with an adaptive process whose goal was to com pensate for the forces imporsed by the field and to return the hands trajectory to that produced be fore the perturbation.
The subjects recovery of perform ance is due to learning. In order to investigate the neural changes underlying this type of m otor learning, Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi (1994) devised a sim ple but revealing experimental manipulation. A f ter the training had been established, they re moved unexpectedly the force field for the duration of a single hand movement. The resulting trajectories, named aftereffects, were approxi mately m irror images of those that were observed when the subjects were initially exposed to the force field. The m agnitude of these aftereffects increased gradually with the practice period. The emergence of the aftereffects indicates that the central nervous system had composed an internal model of the external force field.
What are the implications for the m aintanence of representations? Recently Brashers-Krug et al. (1996) investigated this question by exposing their subjects to perturbing force fields that interfered with the execution of reaching movements. After practicing reaching movements, these subjects were able to compensate for the imposed forces and were able to guide the cursor accurately to the targets despite the disturbing forces. This group of subjects, which was tested 24 hours later with the same disturbing forces, dem onstrated not only re tention of the aquired m otor skill, but also addi tional learning. Surprisingly, they perform ed at a significantly higher level on day 2 than they had on day 1 .
A second group of subjects was trained on day one with one pattern of forces (say pattern B) im mediately after learning a different pattern (A). Pattern B produced forces in a clockwise directioon, but forces in the opposite direction were gen erated during exposure to pattern A. W hen this second group of subjects was tested for retention on day 2 on pattern A, Brashers-Krug et al. (1996) found that the subjects did not retain any of the skills that had been learned in A. This phenom e non is known as retrograde interference. Next, Brashers-Krug et al. (1996) investigated whether the susceptibility to retrograde interference de creased with time. They found that retrograde in terference decreased monotonically with time as the interval between pattern A and B increased. When 4 hours passed before pattern B was learned, the skill learned during exposure to pattern A was retained -the initial learning had consolidated. What is rem arkable in these results is that motor memory is transform ed with the pas sage of time and in the absence of further practice, from an initial fragile state to a m ore solid state.
What is the nature of the interaction with struc tures downstream? Recently Bizzi et al. (1991) and Giszter et al. (1993) investigated the circuitry of the cortico-spinal pathway and proposed that the spinal cord interneurons are organized in func tional modules to produce muscle synergies. They could show that the spinal cord contains circuitry that, when activated, produces precisely balanced contractions in groups of muscles. These synergis tic contractions generate forces that direct the limb toward an equilibrium point in space. Furtherm ore they could show that microstimula tion of the lumbar gray resulted in a limited num ber of force patterns. A num ber of regions of the spinal cord gray from which the same force pattern was elicited were identified. The sim ulta neous stimulation of two sites, each generating a force field, results in a force field proportional to the vector sum of the two fields. Vector summa tion of force fields implies that the complex nonlinearities that characterize the interactions both among neurons and between neurons and muscles are in some way eliminated. More importantly, this result has led to a novel hypothesis for ex plaining movement and posture based on combi nations of a few basic elements. The limited force pattern may be viewed as representing an elem en tary alphabet from which, through superposition, a vast num ber of movements could be fashioned by impulses conveyed by supraspinal pathways.
Taken together the just described experiments indicate that: First, the internal model of the dis turbing force field develops and effectively cancels the external influence. Second, there is an en hancem ent of the internal model which does not depend upon practice, but only the mere passage of time. The process of consolidation of the in ternal model which takes four hours as a minimum and is not dependent upon practice. Third, the pri mary m otor cortex may be viewed not as acting on individual muscles, but on using a limited set of basic force fields as basic building blocks to gen erate movements.
Interareal interactions in the visual system (presented by Peter König)
The representation of visual stimuli by the pri mary visual cortex might be one of the best studied examples of a neuronal representation of the external environment. Nevertheless, the read out of this representation by neurons in other areas is poorly understood . To investigate the coupling between primary visual cortex and cortical areas considered to be down stream the interaction between area 17 (primary visual cortex) and parietal association cortex (area 7) was examined during a visuomotor GO/NO-GO task in the awake cat von Stein et al., 1997) . Cats were trained to respond to target stimuli which em erged from a neutral mask, by either pressing a lever (G O ) or by continuing to track the target visually (NO-GO). Local field potentials in both areas were recorded with bipo lar electrodes, and synchronization within and be tween cortical columns of each area was assessed by cross-correlation analyses. Recordings during the prestimulus period, used as baseline, were do minated by power in the low frequencies. The mask stimulus elicited a strong evoked potential but only a m oderate increase in synchronization between areas 17 and 7. In contrast, the subse quent target stimuli elicited a weak evoked poten tial but a much greater degree of synchronization both within area 7 and between area 17 and area 7. This increase was strongly dependent on the as sociated behaviour. Synchronization of both types was most prominent in the middle frequency range (5 -2 0 Hz). While activity in this frequency range is usually associated with behavioural inactivity and lack of attention evidence was obtained that the increased coupling was specific for trials in which the cat was attentive and responded cor rectly. A surprising result was the effect of the pre sentation of new visual stimuli. Those surprising stimuli lead to a complete cessation of the cou pling in the middle frequency range and to an increase of the synchronization in the gamma fre quency band. In conclusion, our results provide di rect physiological evidence, that the neuronal ac tivity in primary and higher visual areas can synchronize. Furtherm ore, in a highly trained par adigm, the coupling is dependend on the behavi oural relevance of the stimulus. And finally, the type of interaction as expressed by the characteris tic frequencies of the synchronized oscillatory ac tivity is different for the readout of a overtrained behaviour and the presentation of new stimuli. Thus, the read-out of a cortical representation ap pears to be specific, reflecting the requirem ents of the task.
What is the nature of the representation and the relevant variables? In these experiments the activ ity of cortical neurons has been m easured by re cording the local field potentials with bipolar electrodes. Do these acurately reflect the unit ac tivity and are they assumed to be causally effec tive? The origin of the local field potential as m easured by intracortical electrodes has not been settled yet. However, experim ental as well as theo retical work indicates that it reflects the currents in the apical dendritic trees of pyramidal neurons. Thus, as the bulk of synaptic connectivity is local, it is reasonable to assume that the local field po tential reflects unit activity (Gray and Singer, 1989) . This, however does not imply causal effects of field potentials on the dynamics of the system. In the present experiments the local field potential is used as an indirect measure of the neuronal ac tivity.
The coupling of neuronal activity in different areas of the visual system occurs predominantly with zero phase lag Roelfsema et al., 1997) . There is pres ently no evidence of information coded by the rel ative phase of neuronal activity, but only of tag ging parts of a distributed representation for common processing.
What is the nature of the interaction with struc tures upstream and downstream? The brain is a recurrent system, where any stage can not be viewed in isolation. The interaction between the different levels however, appears to be asymetric. The higher areas do not change the level of activ ity in the primary one, but differentially coupling into the representation depending on the require ments of the task (see also König and Luksch, 1998: this issue, pp. 542-549) .
What are the implications for the formation and maintenance of representations. The observation of coupling between the two areas in different fre quency bands for trained and new stimuli suggests the existence of two different modes of operation. One may be for the read out of established repre sentations, another possibly for the formation of new representations. However, these results are preliminary and the underlying mechanisms not yet understood.
Space, time, and the binding problem (an interlude)
The hypothesis of binding by synchronization of neuronal activity has been introduced for several reasons (Peter König). The most im portant aspect is the flexibility it allows in tagging distributed rep resentations for joint processing. In a highly repe titive task, it seems natural to create specialized circuitry for fast and effective perform ance (also see above). Flexibility in a situation where the cross talk created by the presence of other objects can not be ignored, however, the specific synchro nization of neuronal activity pertaining to one ob ject appears to be a valid solution. The existence of double selective neurons, e.g. color and orienta tion, orientation and velocity, ... does not make the task of detection continuity in a distributed representation trivial, but can actually be used to facilitate synchronization and allow the differential readout by other neu rons. Thus, in order to investigate the relevance of the precise timing of neuronal activity paradigms employing flexible tasks have to be used.
The proposition that the 'binding problem ' may be solved by neurons coding for specific com bina tions of sensory attributes from a particular stimu lus ; see also this vol ume) is a reasonable one (Neil Burgess). It may be attacked on the grounds that coding for all pos sible combinations of attributes of objects would require a num ber of neurons even greater than present in the brain. However it is interesting to note that, for physical objects, the binding prob lem could be solved by neurons responding to pairs of sensory attributes and object locations. All of those neurons that code for a particular location that are currently active then represent all of the sensory attributes of the object at that location. In this sense spatial location may have a specific importance beyond attributes such as color or shape. Neurons coding for all possible com bina tions of attributes would not be necessary. How ever, it should be noted that in other modalities (e.g. audition) spatial location might not be a reli able segmentation cue (Mike Kilgard).
In the situation of the "binding" of form and motion (Oram and Perrett, 1996) , STS neurons re sponsive to particular body views moving in partic ular directions show response sensitivity to Jo hansson type figures (lights attached to the joints, then all other visual infrom ation removed). This shows that "motion cues" alone can have inform a tion about the body form. This conjunction greatly simplifies the binding problem (Mike Oram) .
Looking at the integrative properties of neu rons, each receiving input from thousands of other neurons, the binding -i.e. the integration of in formation -is actually the default of the system operation (Peter König). Thus to integrate the complete information in a reduced environm ent should not pose special difficulty. However, the problem arising in environments of reasonable complexity is to keep unrelated sources apart. Here, interacting stimuli give rise to cross-talk be tween different processing channels, and using the temporal domain to avoid this cross-talk might be one solution among others.
The example of cell responses being able to use motion to extract form indicates that the apparent separation of channels need not be complete (Mike Oram). In striate cortex, the sensitivity to objects outside the classic receptive field indicates this again. Further, cells of V I are rarely (if ever) only sensitive to one stimulus attribute, but rather show tuning to many (e.g. orientation, spatial fre quency, colour etc). It is this conjoint selectivity that makes the notion of "red " detectors and "tri angle" detectors meaningless. This is a very good point, and the other side of the coin is that the interaction between channels previously thought to be separated, e.g. the magno and parvocellular system (Sawatari and Callaway, 1996) is the origin of the cross-talk in realistic en vironments (Peter König). It is not clear whether this "cross-talk" is noise (i.e. unwanted) or "by design" to integrate these two channels (Mike Oram) .
From a technical point of view the distribution of information seems to be possible in quite an easy way (G erhard Sagerer). Assume, that faces are coded and represented by a num ber of dif ferent features. An instance of a certain feature gives a hint to one or m ore individual faces, which are "active". H ere active means that out of all stored faces a num ber of individuals are prese lected by the context. The collection of features gives estimates on individuals but only on those which are preselected. The most probable one will be chosen. Com pared to com puter architectures, a small subset of a great num ber of registers is se lected as working memory by an offset address. Switching the context means changing the offset. All the addresses of registers are interpreted ac cording to this offset. The "world" outside this subset is not activated in the given situation. For the re-cognition of individuals, establishing a context guarantees good estimates for the task. The problem of near misses and therefore the need for very detailed features and their available num ber of features can be reduced, if their exists a good selection mechanism for contexts A nother problem to be addressed by any de scription of the visual system is the amazing speed of its perform ance (M ike Oram). The properties described above are present in less than 1 0 0 ms from stimulus onset. Given the structure of the vi sual system and a total m ean delay of 5 ms by each synaptic step, this does not leave any room for it erative processing, but the activity seems to rush through the system and establish the stimulus specificity on the very first go. How this can fit into a scheme depending on the synchronization of neuronal activity is unclear.
The rapid processing of new stimuli is also a problem of schemes using very sparse representa tions for the representation of visual stimuli (Eilon Vaadia). Are we born with those neurons or do they develop their specificity on the fly? Is this compatible with the perform ance of primates?
On the representation o f space by means o f visual motion (presented by Nicolas Franceschini)
Humans and many animals including insects can make use of visual motion detection to navigate at high speed in most complex environments. In spired by recent electrophysiological studies on flies a robot was constructed whose visual system exclusively computes motion. Nevertheless, it has been dem onstrated to cope with complex, unpre dictable environments, and navigate without 'bumping into things'. By attem pting to extract the essence of visually-guided locomotion from the cartoon-like visual system of the fly and reproduc ing it on a physical artefact, this approach has un derlined the two-way interaction that exists be tween vision and locomotion, whereby locomotion proper is just as necessary to the visual system as a visual system may be necessary for locomotion.
First, the process of motion detection was ana lysed in the housefly. As the retinal mosaic is read ily accessible, elem entary m otion stimuli were induced by using a specially-built 'microscope-telescope'. Two neighbouring photoreceptor cells with a diam eter of 1 micron each were stimulated in sequence, thereby simulating a m icromovement in the visual field. Simultaneously the response of an identified neurone in the lobula plate was re corded with a microelectrode (Franceschini et al., 1989) . This technique allowed to establish a func tional diagram of a typical fly 'local motion detect ing neuron' and to characterize its various dy namics and nonlinearities.
Second, the signal processing associated with a fly local motion detecting neuron was transcribed into analog electronics, opening the way to the re alisation of a complete creature equipped with a compound eye. This com pound eye is panoramic (in the azimuthal plane only) and comprises 118 visual detectors. Each pair of facets gives input to a local m otion detector. The system is installed on board of the creature, and is responsible for guid ing the movement of the robot (Franceschini et al., 1992) . This visually-guided robot dem onstrator shares the many properties with its biological forerunner: (1) a zig/zag locom otor strategy, whereby pure translations alternate with pure rotations -as ob served in flying flies; (2) analog processing in each local motion detecting neuron and throughout the visuomotor system; (3) parallel processing in the local motion detecting neuron array, giving rise to retinotopic circuitry; (4) asynchronous processing in the local motion detecting neurons, each one carrying out its com putation regardless of its neighbour; (5) panoram ic visual field and nonuni form sampling of visual space by the facet mosaic; (6) exoskeleton construction (no backbone).
W hat is the nature of the representation? O b stacles are represented in a retinocentric frame of reference (which is refreshed after each saccade) by the azimuthal location of those local motion detecting neurons which detected contrasts with a retinal slip speed larger than a threshold value. Each one of these 'dangerous' contrasts generates a forbidden sector for the next step and all the forbidden sectors are fused, leaving perm itted sec tors within which the robot chooses its next direc tion. In response to the detected obtacles, the ro bot makes body and eye saccades, during which vision is disabled (c.f. corollary discharge). The novel direction adopted for the next step is the closest to that of the target within the perm itted sectors. Thus there is no symbolic representation of the obstacles, and the robot needs hardly any memory, not only because it sees its whole envi ronm ent at any given time, but also because it does not have to carry out any path planning. Most importantly, vision exclusively takes place during the pure translation phases of locomotion. The ro bot must actually move in order to see and thereby creates a representation of space. Thus the nature of the representation can be fully appreciated only in the behaving artefact.
This exercise in "visually-guided navigation based on motion detection" showed that a decent representation of space can be achieved by detect ing relative motion and that this representation is sufficient for a creature to take proper actions and steer safely and rapidly (50 cm/s) in a contrasted, unpredictable environment. This is done by the 12 kg fully autonom ous creature, as all its all-analog computation is carried out onboard. Further studies have shown that the same principle can be used not only for steering but also for controlling the cruising speed of a vehicle so that it autom ati cally adjusts to the cluttering of the environm ent (M artin and Franceschini, 1994) .
Building a complete biologically-derived crea ture and keeping close to nature in term s of locomotory principles, signal processing and architec tures guaranties a rich feedback to biology. It raised new problems, which led to the design of novel experiments with the animal that might not have been thought of otherwise. From the out come of these experiments a novel robot was built, which incorporates new features. Switching to and fro from neurobiology to robotics appears to be one way to foster both sciences at one and the same time.
H ybrid Representation in A rtificial Systems (presented by Gerhard Sagerer)
Artificial systems which act in a real environ ment must have knowledge about possible objects, events or processes. A t a first glance, objects and their features can be viewed as data, processes in the external world and behaviours of the system as programs, and events can be viewed as special transitions between states of the external world. In the AI and Pattern Recognition community a lot of work is still dealing with the problem of rep resentation of objects and processes from that point of view (c.f. Sagerer and Niemann, 1997) . According to the perception action cycle, the matching of perceived stimuli to some internal prototypes or categories is one m ajor basis. Vari ous types of neural network (c.f. R itter et al., 1994) or statistical (c.f. Schuermann, 1996) approaches are proposed for this problem. Com mon to these paradigms is that a classification of a stimulus as an entire object or event is perform ed. In contrast, most explicit knowledge representation tech niques collect information of parts or on certain features to classify an object or event according to the underlying hierarchy. Therefore, the partwhole relationship also offers a procedural sem an tic how to evaluate the data in a sequential m an ner. Combination of symbolic representation and analogue representation by weights can be com bined to form hybrid schemes as proposed in Kümmert et al. (1993) . Additionally, several hier archies in the sense of a stratified model can be distinguished. From the bottom to the top in this model the binding by sensory input decreases and the am ount of a priori inform ation used for the interpretation increases. The control flow depends on the certainty of actual estim ations on the reli ability. Levels e.g. may be edges, templates, colors, shape, objects. Classification and interpretation of perceived signals help to built a representation of the state of an agent. It must be enriched by infor mation about internal features. Because not all in formation about the external world is observable and not all observable inform ation can be repre sented in a certain state, probabilistic modeling is necessary. Following (Ballard, 1997) MarkovModels and M arkov-Decision-Processes can de scribe behaviours and programs of natural and ar tificial systems in an adequate way. Again hierar chies of such models concerning both the representation of states and the transitions and ac tions can be constructed. Two further hierarchies must be taken into account: the precision of results and the time needed to get some results. The im portance of iterative processing as well as the dif ferent time scales is pointed out in (Ballard, 1997) . Iterative algorithms allows an incremental pro cessing which can guarantee a fast availability of guesses and longer processing time improves these estimations. The coordination of processing units with a large variation of processing time is still an open problem. U p to now only first steps are made in order to construct situated robots (Poole et al., 1998) for suitable complex environments and tasks. But on the other hand the cooperation of different disciplines for this goal resulted already in large improvements.
The em bodim ent and the form ation o f representa tions (presented by Christian Scheier)
Categorization involves a mapping of regions of input space belonging to one object onto an invari ant output. Category learning consists in the acquisition of this mapping. There are two main problems involved in learning category represen tations of real world objects. First, the sensory sti mulation from one and the same object can vary greatly depending on distance, viewing angle, lighting conditions etc. This is also called the ob ject constancy problem. Second, objects belonging to different categories can result in very similar sensory stimulation. The surprising point about these problems is that they are (subjectively) eas ily solved by biological agents, but very hard for artificial recognition systems (e.g. Ullman, 1996) . In a recent study Moses et al. (1994) , for example, have compared face images from different individ uals, views (5 per individual), and illumination conditions (4 per individual). The comparison of these images by means of several similarity meas ures indicated that the differences induced in the changes in viewing conditions were large com pared with the difference between the different in dividuals. Humans, however, that had to recognize the same images had a very high (97%) recogni tion rate when trained with a single image of each one of the individuals and tested on all other images.
What are the implications for the formation of representations? Traditionally, the formation of category representations has been thought of as a problem of learning a function that maps a sensory input onto an explicit, internal category represen tation (e.g. category nodes in connectionist m od els). The main problem with this approach is that due to the problems m entioned earlier, such a function might not exist, at least not in the raw sensory data. Nolfi (1996) , for example, has shown that a backpropagation network (i.e. a powerful function approximator) perfoms very poorly in the seemingly simple problem of learning the distinc tion between a small cylinder and walls. Put dif ferently, the relevant structures are "hidden" or are only "marginal", so that an uninform ed learn ing algorithm is unable to detect them. Such input spaces are also said to be of type 2 (Clark and Thornton, 1997) . Type 2 data sets have to be trans formed into type 1 spaces in order for the regulari ties to come to the fore. Recent research in em bodied cognitive science suggests that this transformation can be achieved by means of spe cific interactions of an agent with the objects to be learned (c.f. see Pfeifer and Scheier, 1998) . In other words, instead of transforming the data in ternally (e.g., by various recoding strategies, see Clark and Thornton (1997) ), an agent can gener ate the regularities by appropriate interactions with the object. This in turn simplifies the category learning (representation formation) process. Or, in other words, their movements transform ed the former type 2 problem into a type 1 problem. Sim-ilar conclusions were obtained in a recent study where agents had to learn to distinguish between 3 types of objects (small and large cylinders, and walls) by interacting with the objects in appropri ate ways . The regulari ties needed to learn to represent the three cate gories were not contained in the raw data and thus could not be learned as such, but rather had to be generated by the agents through specific interac tions such as circling around objects. This suggests that em bodim ent might play an im portant role in the form ation of representations in that it enables an agent to transform its sensory stimuli such that it can learn the appropriate input-output mapping. This in turn significantly reduces the amount of processing necessary to form representations.
Interactions and an educated guess (presented by M ike Kilgard)
The mammalian brain is a highly sophisticated self-organizing system, which continually adapts it's responses to best match the environment an individual occupies. Exactly what is m eant by the best match is.unclear, however. There is no objec tive way to define what an optimal representation of sensory or m otor information would look like. There are certain qualities of neural representa tions which they should have if they are to be of adaptive value to the organism.
W hat is the nature of representations? Inform a tion should be of a form that is readily useful for modulating behaviour. For example although vis ual inform ation arrives in retinotopic coordinates, guiding grasping movements would be easier if the location of objects could be determ ined in bodycentered coordinates. Sensory information which is parsed into behaviourally im portant features, such as color and motion, also appears to facilitate behavioural responses and associations which de pend on these features. R epresentational strate gies which facilitate appropriate categorization and generalization functions also improve behavi oural performance. Because the brain has finite storage capacity and com putational power, effi cient use of these resources is important. The sta bility of representations is also a significant factor to consider.
W hat are the implications for the formation of representations? Although it is possible, in prin ciple, to learn about the world via simple trial and error, such a strategy is not particularly efficient and risks getting the organism killed in the pro cess. For example, organisms which determ ined what plants were poisonous by eating each new species encountered and waiting to see if it got sick are unlikely to survive long. Organisms which randomly change their representational strategy hoping to stumble into im proved perform ance are likewise doomed. Fortunately by virtue of their ev olutionary history biological organisms are able to combine interaction with the world with another important strategy: guessing. Animals come pre equipped with guesses about how to handle many situations. Having good guesses about how to han dle particular novel situations or how to represent novel stimuli would obviously impart an evolu tionary advantage. Hum an infants, for example, do a great deal of exploration of the world with their mouths, but fortunately this exploration is com bined with innate knowledge that certain tastes (particularly bitter ones) are to be avoided. Thus many items can be expelled without determining whether they actually cause sickness. Behavioural research is replete with examples of animals m ak ing good behavioural choices even in completely novel situations. When an animal does not know what to do it guesses and often these guesses are shaped by simple rules which are genetically en coded (i.e. rats hate cats and babies are afraid of stimuli which indicate high energy sources, such as loud sounds and bright lights). It appears that sim ple rules also guide the brain in changing its repre sentations of sensory information.
Without good guesses even apparently simple problems like extracting basic features from sen sory information can be intractable, because the sensory input could be transform ed in an infinite number of ways. It is rarely obvious from the sen sory stream what the behaviourally relevant fea tures might be. Although the problem is made eas ier when the organism is fortunate enough to have receptors which only encode information which is directly relevant (i.e. frog retina, also see above), in most higher organisms data is not so heavily pre-processed and the problem remains undercon strained.
The auditory cortex provides concrete examples of several of the rules cortex uses to guide it's own plasticity. Although it is intuitive that improving the representation of stimuli which are consist ently associated with behaviourally arousing situa tions (probably signalled by ascending neuromodulatory systems) would be a useful strategy, it is not clear what an improved representation would be like. Merzenich and collegues (1990) have shown that there is an expansion of the region of the auditory cortex map representing the fre quency range heavily exercised during extensive behavioural training. Thus it appears that one way to improve the representation of sensory stimuli is to increase the num ber of cortical neurons which respond to the them.
A lterations of receptive field size have also been observed following behavioural training. Interest ingly, the direction of the change was dependent on the nature of the task. Receptive field sizes were increased following tem poral tasks (discrimi nation of am plitude m odulation rate), and de creased when fine frequency discrimination was required (Recanzone et al., 1992; . This same differential plasticity was generated independently of any behavioural task by pairing different classes of stimuli with electrical stimulation of the cholingeric nucleus basalis (Kilgard and Merzenich, 1998) . In this paradigm temporally modulated tones resulted in larger receptive fields, while pair ing two different tone frequencies with nucleus basalis stimulation resulted in smaller receptive fields. One advantage of this paradigm is that it allows for the mechanisms of plasticity to be ob served independently of behavioural engagement with the stimuli. These results dem onstrate that the cortex can use the input itself to determine how to alter its internal representations.
Thus it is the combination of built-in rules and real-world interactions which allows the brain the flexibility to generate appropriate compensation for damage to sensory systems, functional recov ery from central nervous system damage, m ainte nance of precise sensory representations, and im provements in behavioural skills (Merzenich etal., 1990) .
Discussion
The evidence presented in the above examples represents some of the great progress that has been made in understanding the representation of spatial, visual, auditory and m otor information in both natural and artificial systems. A num ber of principles of representation were common to all of these examples. The importance of the interac tion of organisms with their environments was ob served in each of the systems studied. The spatially specific firing of hippocampal place cells depends upon the autonomous movement of the rat around its environment, and is not present when the rat is immobilised. In the prim ate tem poral lobe, repre sentation of objects is predominantly in a viewercentred reference frame which, unlike an objectcentred representation, allows for appropriate in teraction with objects. The learning of representa tion of motor action within a force field provides the most direct example of the im portance of in teraction with the world in learning. The coupling of local field potentials in striate and parietal corti ces is also dependent upon the interaction of the cat with its environment. The fly guides its move ment using a representation of the world derived from the optic flow generated by its own motion. Recent work on artificial systems focuses on classi fication and knowledge representation based on events experienced in situ, rather than on the traditional complete world model (collection of all features, objects, physical laws etc). Motion of a robot within its environment can greatly simplify the problem of forming a behaviourally useful rep resentation by providing additional (e.g. tem poral) structure to sensory input. Experim ents conducted in auditory cortex suggest that the nature of plas ticity is dependent on the exact nature of the sen sory input, with the relationship between different stimulus attributes and behavioural im portance causing appropriate changes in the representation of the stimuli in auditory cortex. Experim ents con ducted in auditory cortex dem onstrate that corti cal representations adapt, using clues provided in the structure of the behaviourally relevant sensory inputs. These examples dem onstrate the im por tance of an organism finding appropriate repre sentations for generating behaviour. In turn, the interaction with the environm ent plays an essen tial role in this process. Thus, the nature of a repre sentation has to be considered in the context of the behaving organism or artefact. Taking these insights seriously will lead to increasing demands on the complexity of experiments and the theoret ical analysis. However, facing the task to under stand neuronal representations, this is not com pletely surprising.
